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“CORRECTIVE” SURGERY
AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Jeannette Cox*

Imagine a potential Americans with Disabilities Act plaintiff named
Sarah. Sarah is a deaf individual who declines to describe herself as
“disabled,” preferring instead a framework that regards deaf individuals as
comprising a cultural minority for which American Sign Language is the
primary language.1 She has forgone cochlear implant surgery, a procedure
that might enable her to process sound, because she regards deafness not as
a disease that needs a cure but as just one among many forms of physical
variation that naturally occur in the human population.2 However, despite
Sarah’s conception of herself as a person without a disability, Sarah
encounters an employer who denies her a job for which she is fully
qualified based on his discomfort with Sarah’s difference, his unwillingness
to challenge his existing employees’ animus toward deaf persons, and his
erroneous belief that Sarah’s deafness will limit her productivity.3
*

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Dayton School of Law. I thank Elizabeth Emens, Benjamin Glatstein, Kent
Hull, and Michael Waterstone for helpful comments on prior drafts of this article. I also
thank Jade Smarda and Jacob Hoover for research assistance, and Kim Ballard for
interlibrary loan support.
1
Disability Studies scholar Harlan Lane explains that:
From the vantage point of Deaf culture, deafness is not a disability.
British Deaf leader Paddy Ladd put it this way: “We wish for the
recognition of our right to exist as a linguistic minority group . . .
Labeling us as disabled demonstrates a failure to understand that we are
not disabled in any way within our own community.”
Harlan Lane, Constructions of Deafness, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 153, 159
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997) (citation omitted). As Lane’s discussion indicates, Deaf
culture scholarship often denotes “deafness” or “deaf” as a physical condition with a lower
case “d,” and “Deafness” or “Deaf” in the cultural sense with an upper case “D.” See
CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA: VOICES FROM A CULTURE 2
(1988).
2
See J. William Evans, Thoughts on the Psychosocial Implications of Cochlear
Implantation in Children, in COCHLEAR IMPLANTS IN YOUNG DEAF CHILDREN 307, 307
(Elmer Owens & Dorcas K. Kessler eds., 1989) (“In an informal survey (Evans,
unpublished raw data), prelingually deafened adults were asked whether they would choose
to have an implant if it were possible that some hearing could be restored. The response
was approximately 85 percent negative.”).
3
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71 (1990) (“Every government and private study on
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If Sarah chooses to challenge the employer’s decision under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the legal consequences of Sarah’s
choice to forego cochlear implant surgery are unclear.4 While some courts
would conclude that Sarah clearly falls within the category of persons the
ADA aims to protect from employment discrimination,5 other courts
suggest that Sarah’s decision not to employ medical technology to reduce
the effects of her deafness may exclude her from the ADA’s protected
class.6 They appear to regard any discrimination Sarah may experience not
as a wrong that the ADA should remedy, but as a consequence Sarah should
avoid by undergoing corrective surgery.7 In effect, they regard Sarah’s
refusal to ascribe negative value to her deafness as precluding her from the
ADA’s protection from disability discrimination.
This split in opinion regarding whether refusing “corrective” surgery
removes an individual from the ADA’s protected class is ripe for
the issue has shown that employers disfavor hiring persons with disabilities because of
stereotypes, discomfort, misconceptions, and unfounded fears about increased costs and
decreased productivity.”); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374–75
(2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not
from malice or hostile animus alone. It may result as well from insensitivity caused by
simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard
against people who appear to be different in some respects from ourselves. Quite apart
from any historical documentation, knowledge of our own human instincts teaches that
persons who find it difficult to perform routine functions by reason of some mental or
physical impairment might at first seem unsettling to us, unless we are guided by the better
angels of our nature. There can be little doubt, then, that persons with mental or physical
impairments are confronted with prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecurity
as well as from malicious ill will.”).
4
See Sever v. Henderson, 381 F. Supp. 2d 405, 414–15 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (noting a circuit
split on the question of whether the ADA affords discrimination protection to individuals
who decline medical technology).
5
See, e.g., Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 2002); Finical v. Collections
Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037–38 (D. Ariz. 1999).
6
See, e.g., Mont-Ros v. City of W. Miami, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1356–57 (S.D. Fla. 2000)
(denying ADA protection because plaintiff’s “sleep apnea condition is treatable and can be
corrected”); Pangalos v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 96-0167, 1996 WL 612469, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1996) (suggesting that a person would not receive the ADA’s protection
if “the disabling condition he allege[d] could readily be remedied surgically”); Roberts v.
County of Fairfax, Va., 937 F. Supp. 541, 548 (E.D. Va. 1996) (“Roberts’ refusal to seek
the recommended and available treatment precludes him from [falling within the ADA’s
protected class].”).
7
Although these courts have not yet examined a case involving forgone cochlear implant
surgery, their conclusions surrounding other types of forgone medical treatment suggests
that they would regard Sarah’s decision to decline cochlear implant surgery as removing
her from the ADA’s protected class. See, e.g., Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F.Supp.
1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (“The choice [not to employ medical technology] being [the
plaintiff’s], it seems difficult if not impossible to understand why the actions of the
defendant should be deemed to be discriminatory.”).
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examination because the recently enacted ADA Amendments Act, although
not focused on the corrective surgery issue, effectively moots many courts’
stated rationales for concluding that the ADA’s protected class excludes
persons who have declined corrective surgery.8 When these amendments
go into effect in January 2009, courts will have to revisit and more squarely
confront the assumption that the ADA requires persons with disabilities to
undergo corrective surgery as a precondition to membership in its protected
class.9
Thus far, the question of whether the ADA’s protected class
excludes persons who decline corrective surgery has received limited
attention because commentary related to corrective surgery has primarily
advanced the claim that courts may limit employers’ accommodation duty
where available medical procedures would render accommodations
unnecessary.10 Due to this overriding focus on limiting the ADA’s
accommodationary burden on employers, the law review literature has
largely sidestepped the more basic question of whether the ADA’s protected
class generally excludes persons who reject medical procedures designed to
eliminate or mask their disability.
This question—whether the ADA’s protected class excludes persons
who decline corrective surgery—has both practical and theoretical
importance. It is important practically because, as Sarah’s situation
indicates, not all potential ADA claimants who reject corrective surgery
need employer-provided disability-based accommodations to perform the
jobs they hold or desire. However, in spite of their ability to work without
such accommodations, they may nonetheless experience the types of
8

See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2008), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-3195.
9
See id.
10
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 217, 234–35 (2004) (arguing that courts should require individuals with disabilities to
reasonably mitigate their disability when doing so would obviate the need for employerprovided accommodations); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Deaf Culture, Cochlear Implants, and
Elective Disability, 28 THE HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6, 10 (1998) (“When most deafness
becomes correctable, which for many people has already occurred and for others may well
happen in the near future, an individual who chooses not to correct his or her deafness (or
the deafness of his or her child) will lack the moral right to demand that others pay for
costly accommodations.”); Lisa A. Key, Voluntary Disabilities and the ADA: A Reasonable
Interpretation of “Reasonable Accommodations,” 48 HASTINGS L. J. 75, 103 (1996)
(arguing that if “an individual with a mutable impairment has [not] taken all reasonable
actions to minimize his condition” then “it will not be reasonable under any circumstances
for his or her employer to bear the cost of an accommodation”). But see Elizabeth F.
Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 878 (2008) (noting that
“instead of demanding that employees assimilate, [the ADA] seems to require the
environment, rather than the individual, to change”).

discriminatory employment decisions, harassment, and retaliation that the
ADA is designed to redress. The question is also theoretically important
because, as Sarah’s reasons for declining cochlear implant surgery suggest,
some persons who decline corrective surgery hope to demonstrate that their
physical difference is not an inherently negative trait that must be “cured”
via medical intervention. Often born with their disability (as opposed to
acquiring it later in life) these individuals resist characterizing themselves
as suffering from a disease. From their vantage point, conventional
“corrective” surgery would not remove a pathogen and restore them to a
preexisting “whole” state but would instead alter what they perceive as their
natural condition.11 Often comparing themselves to left-hand dominant
persons whose refusal to shed their physical variation served to transform
previous beliefs that left-handed persons must conform to right-hand
dominant norms, these individuals hope to reshape cultural attitudes toward
their difference.12 By gaining access to the workplace and other realms of
11

See Experiences of Deviance, Chronic Illness, and Disability, in THE SOCIAL MEDICINE
READER 75, 76 (Gail E. Henderson et al. eds., 1997) (“[A] study of 88 seriously physically
restricted persons posed the question, ‘If you were given one wish, would you wish that
you were no longer disabled?’ Only half said they would wish to remove their disability.”)
(citation omitted); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 14 (1993) (quoting a wheelchair user as stating that she
would not take “a magic pill” that would allow her to walk again and that asking her to do
so is “the same thing as asking a black person would he change the color of his skin”);
Nancy Weinberg, Physically Disabled People Assess the Quality of Their Lives, 45
REHABILITATION LITERATURE 12, 13 (1984) (finding that many people with disabilities
indicate that they would refuse a risk-free surgery that would completely eliminate their
disabilities, because they “fear that they would no longer be the same person”); Andrew
Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 28, 1994, at 65 (“From the Deaf point of
view, the notion that implants are beneficial ‘is both inappropriate and offensive—as if
doctors and newspapers joyously announced advances in genetic engineering that might
someday make it possible to turn black skin white.’”); Marie Arana-Ward, As Technology
Advances, a Bitter Debate Divides the Deaf, WASH. POST, May 11, 1997, at A1 (“‘Let me
put it this way,’ [Judith Coryell, head of the deaf education program at Western Maryland
College has explained]. ‘Say you were black. Do you think you’d be considering surgery
to make yourself white?’”); see also BERNARD BRAGG, LESSONS IN LAUGHTER: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A DEAF ACTOR 4 (Eugene Bergman trans., 1989) (“I thought deafness
was a way of life and never linked it with sickness, defectiveness, or a handicapped
condition. I thought, and I still do, that my deafness is just part of who I am.”).
12
See, e.g., Joe Griffith, Disability Studies Chairman Chosen, INDEPENDENT COLLEGIAN,
Apr. 14, 2008, available at
http://media.www.independentcollegian.com/media/storage/paper678/news/2008/04/14/Ne
ws/Disability.Studies.Chairman.Chosen-3322922.shtml (“The medical field tends to view
physical disabilities as a negative condition needing to be fixed, Wilkins said. ‘In our
world, we believe the disability is part of us,’ he said. ‘We’re fine how we are.’” (quoting
Dan Wilkins, manager of public relations for the Ability Center of Greater Toledo)); Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

public life, they hope to gradually convince others that their physical
differences might be accepted rather than erased.
This article argues that reading the ADA’s nondiscrimination
mandate to cover persons like Sarah who decline “corrective” surgery is
consistent with both the ADA’s core purpose and its text. Focusing on the
ADA’s purpose and its relationship to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, section I argues that the ADA’s overarching aim to reshape cultural
responses to disability suggests that individuals need not acquiesce to all
available medical efforts to eliminate their disability before they may
challenge the negative social responses they experience. Instead, the ADA
appears to give individuals, such as Sarah, the opportunity to argue that
their physical differences should be accepted rather than masked or erased.
Section II demonstrates that, textually, the ADA’s coverage provisions
include persons like Sarah who decline “corrective” surgery. It further
suggests that the Supreme Court’s Sutton v. United Air Lines decision,13
which contributed to many courts’ conclusions that the ADA requires
individuals to undergo corrective surgery, in fact discourages courts from
excluding persons from the ADA’s protected class based on the
hypothetical benefits of forgone medical technology.
I.

“CORRECTIVE” SURGERY AND THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY

A. The ADA’s Social Model of Disability
Title I of the ADA is patterned on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race,

1415, 1471 (2007) (noting that members of the “Deaf Culture” movement have “resisted
the cochlear implant movement, arguing that deafness d[oes] not necessarily have to be
‘cured’”); Amy Harmon, How About Not ‘Curing’ Us, Some Autistics Are Pleading, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A1 (“‘We don’t have a disease,’ said Jack, echoing the opinion of
the other 15 boys at the experimental [school for autistic teenagers]. ‘So we can’t be
“cured.” This is just the way we are.’”).
Left-handed individuals currently make up approximately twelve percent of the
population in Western societies because parents, educators and other persons who influence
children have become more permissive in allowing left-handed children to remain lefthanded. By contrast, in countries that continue to view left-handedness as a problem, the
incidence of left-handedness is less than five percent. Korea Still Rough Place for the LeftHanded, DIGITAL CHOSUN, Oct. 22, 2004,
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200410/200410220027.html; see also
MARTIN GARDNER, THE AMBIDEXTROUS UNIVERSE: LEFT, RIGHT, AND THE FALL OF
PARITY 77 (1964) (“Many authorities estimate that about 25 per cent are born left-handed .
. . .”).
13
527 U.S. 471 (1999).

sex, color, religion, and national origin.14 In the decade following Title
VII’s enactment, civil rights advocates attempted to amend Title VII to add
“disability” to Title VII’s protected categories.15 Although they ultimately
achieved their goal to prohibit employment discrimination based on
disability three decades after Title VII’s passage in Title I of the ADA, Title
I’s provisions substantially parallel Title VII.16
Like Title VII, Title I prohibits intentional discrimination against
members of its protected class as well as facially neutral policies that persist
“through inertia or insensitivity” to exclude protected individuals.17 In this
manner, Title I echoes the conclusion embodied in Title VII that social
14

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); see Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone,
Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 921 (2006)
(“Congress’s impetus for passing Title VII (and then amending it in 1991) was strikingly
similar to that underlying enactment of the ADA’s employment provisions. In both cases,
Congress recognized the need to eliminate barriers that historically had excluded groups
from the workplace.”).
15
See H.R. 14033, 92d Cong. (1972) (discussing an attempt in 1972 to add “mental or
physical handicap” to the list of protected classes under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); S. REP. NO. 96-316, at 1 (1979) (discussing a similar attempt in 1979).
16
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 22–24; Ruth Colker, The ADA’s Journey Through
Congress, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 46 (2004) (noting that “the ADA borrows Title
VII’s enforcement scheme”); Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability, Doctors and Dollars:
Distinguishing the Three Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1175, 1178 (2002) (“Structurally and substantively, the ADA is based on Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .”). The senators who introduced the ADA in 1989 expressly
invoked the memory of the Civil Rights Act, describing persons with disabilities as a
“minority” comparable to African-Americans and championing the ADA as designed to
help “end this American apartheid.” 101 CONG. REC. 8514 (1989) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy); see also, e.g., 101 CONG. REC. 8507–07 (1989) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy and
Sen. Harkin).
17
Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1992). Disparate
treatment cases involve situations in which an employer singles out a plaintiff for
disadvantage because of her protected class status. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973). Disparate impact cases involve situations in which the employer
imposes a neutral rule that screens out members of a protected class without sufficient
business justification. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1971);
see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (noting that the ADA
encompasses both types of cases).
Although some ADA scholarship characterizes the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation provision as dramatically different from Title VII’s nondiscrimination
provisions, recent scholarship has persuasively demonstrated that it parallels Title VII’s
requirement that employers eliminate barriers that disparately impact members of the
groups Title VII protects. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:
ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 673 (2004) (“ADAmandated accommodations are consistent with other antidiscrimination measures because
each remedies artificial exclusion from employment opportunity by questioning the
necessity of established workplace norms.”).

factors contribute to the exclusion and subordination of certain groups and
that, accordingly, social remedies can gradually remove the disadvantages
such groups experience.
As the ADA’s relationship to Title VII suggests, the ADA
acknowledges that many of the disadvantages associated with disability do
not proceed inevitably from an individual’s biology but instead derive from
social exclusion and subordination. In its statutory findings provision, the
ADA outlines the need for a remedy for disability discrimination in terms
comparable to the rationales for Title VII’s remedies for race and sex
discrimination. It notes that “historically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements,
such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue
to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”18 It further declares that
individuals with disabilities “have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society.”19 The
ADA further notes the need to remedy “the discriminatory effects of
architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective
rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and
practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and
relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other
opportunities.”20
In this way, the ADA reflects what sociologists have termed a
“social model” of disability, which suggests “a switch away from focusing
on the physical limitations of particular individuals to the way the physical
and social environments impose limitations upon certain groups or
categories of people.”21 The social model directly rejects pre-ADA
“medical model” thinking about disability, which regarded the
disadvantages an individual with a disability experiences as flowing directly
and inevitably from her aberrant biology.22
Indiana Commissioner of Veteran’s Affairs Gary May’s comments
at a Congressional hearing on the ADA reflect the social model’s primary
18

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
Id. § 12101(a)(7).
20
Id. § 12101(a)(5).
21
MICHAEL OLIVER, SOCIAL WORK WITH DISABLED PEOPLE 23 (1983); see also CLAIRE H.
LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: LEGISLATIVE ROOTS 11 (1988);
MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 10 (1990).
22
See MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE &
THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 237 (2003) (noting that within a medical model of
disability, disability is “a personal, medical problem, requiring but an individualized
medical solution; that people who have disabilities face no ‘group’ problem caused by
society or that social policy should be used to ameliorate”).
19

insights:
The general thrust and motivation for adaptive behavior by
persons with disabilities has been from the “disability as
liability” perspective. From this perspective, the existence of
a disability is a totally negative phenomenon which must be
conquered. This perspective does not fully embrace the
concept of individual differences and pushes for
standardization and homogenization in a society which
operates from the same premise. This process is commonly
understood as fitting the square peg into the round hole. The
intractability of the round hole is accepted as a given.23
As May’s comments suggest, many advocates for the ADA believed that
disability policy prior to the ADA had overemphasized physical limitations
and accordingly ignored the ways in which culturally contingent factors
serve to constrict the opportunities available to persons with disabilities.24
While disability policy prior to the ADA focused predominantly on
“curing” persons with disabilities or otherwise adjusting them to fit existing
cultural conceptions of normality,25 the social model of disability embodied
in the ADA focuses on adjustments to the cultural environment that the
individual with a disability inhabits.
B. The Social Model and “Corrective” Surgery
The social model’s placement of responsibility for the disadvantages
associated with disability on cultural factors, rather than solely on
unmediated biology, suggests a perspective on medical treatment that
differs from the pre-ADA assumption that persons with disabilities cannot
reject medical efforts to eliminate or mask their disability. The social
model emphasizes the manner in which the disadvantages associated with
disability are largely cultural—and thus culturally contingent. Accordingly,
23

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before the H. Comm. on
Education and Labor, 101st Cong. 79 (1988) (statement of Gary May, Commissioner,
Indiana Department of Veterans’ Affairs).
24
See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 654
(1999).
25
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 427
(2000) (noting that pre-ADA policy “treat[ed] disability as an inherent personal
characteristic that should ideally be fixed, rather than as a characteristic that draws its
meaning from social context”); Harlan Hahn, The Potential Impact of Disability Studies on
Political Science (as Well as Vice-Versa), 21 POL’Y STUD. J. 740, 741 (1993) (noting that
social policy regarding disability has historically focused predominantly on the need for
“medical repair”).

it suggests that persons with disabilities need not acquiesce to all available
medical efforts to eliminate their disability before they may challenge the
negative social responses and unnecessary barriers they experience.
As philosopher Anita Silvers suggests, “[b]y hypothesizing what
social arrangements would be in place were persons with disabilities
dominant rather than suppressed, it becomes evident that systematic
exclusion of the disabled is a consequence not of their natural inferiority but
of their minority social status.”26 For example, anthropological research has
usefully illustrated the ways in which some of the disadvantages related to
deafness are culturally contingent. Nora Groce studied Martha’s Vineyard
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a period in which
approximately 1 in 155 islanders was deaf—as compared to 1 in 5728 in the
mainland population.27 Within this community, Groce found that deaf
people were “completely integrated into community life, enjoying the same
types of occupations, income levels and relationships as hearing people”28
because all the islanders—including those with no hearing impairment and
those with no deaf relatives—spoke an indigenous sign language.29 Groce
notes that “[p]erhaps the best description of the status of deaf individuals on
the Vineyard was given to me by an island woman in her eighties, when I
asked about those who were handicapped by deafness when she was a girl.
‘Oh,’ she said emphatically, ‘those people weren’t handicapped. They were
just deaf.’”30
These observations suggest that many of the disadvantages
associated with deafness result not directly from the physical state of
deafness but from stigmatization, isolation, and hearing persons’ lack of
familiarity with sign language. When these cultural responses to deafness
are not present, both deaf and hearing individuals regard deafness not as a
disability but as a relatively insignificant physical trait. Disability studies
scholars have documented similar attitudes toward deafness in schools
where teachers instruct deaf and hearing children together in both English

26

Anita Silvers, Reconciling Equality to Difference: Caring (F)or Justice for People with
Disabilities, HYPATIA, Winter 1995, at 30, 48.
27
NORA ELLEN GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE: HEREDITARY DEAFNESS
ON MARTHA’S VINEYARD 3 (1985).
28
Id. at 80–85 (illustrating that, by using tax, census, bank and other records for deaf and
non-deaf persons, deaf individuals experienced no economic disadvantages vis-à-vis
hearing islanders and noting that mainland deaf persons during the same time period, by
contrast, did experience significant economic disadvantage).
29
See id. at 63 (“Hearing members of the community were so accustomed to using signs
that the language found its way into discussions even when no deaf people were present.”).
30
Id. at 5; see also id. at 110 (concluding that the deaf individuals on Martha’s Vineyard
“were not handicapped, because no one perceived their deafness as a handicap”).

and American Sign Language.31 Under these cultural conditions, the
disadvantages normally associated with deafness significantly diminish.
By revealing that many of the disadvantages experienced by persons
with disabilities derive from culturally contingent factors rather than
unmediated biology, the social model of disability suggests that the value of
many medical treatments designed to address disability can be largely
extrinsic.32 Many kinds of disabilities, such as deafness, “do not per se
detract from a person’s health,”33 and bear no indicia of disease except to
the extent that nondisabled persons erroneously use the language of disease
to describe the disadvantages that persons with disabilities experience.
Close examination reveals that the disadvantages persons with disabilities
experience often are not physical pain and weakness, but instead
stigmatization, isolation, and difficulty navigating physical environments
designed solely for persons without disabilities. If such culturally
contingent factors were not present, many conventional medical treatments
for disability might appear less necessary, just as a cure for deafness
appeared unnecessary on Martha’s Vineyard in the eighteenth and early

31

See, e.g., SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 61 (1998).
Roz Rosen, a past president of the National Association of the Deaf, has defended Deaf
individuals’ decisions to reject cochlear implants by suggesting that since “[h]earing is not
a life or death matter and consequently not worth the medical, moral, and ethical risk of
altering a [person].” Roz Rosen, President Rosen on Cochlear Implants, NAD
BROADCASTER, Dec. 1992, at 6. See also Position Statement, National Association of the
Deaf, Cochlear Implants (Oct. 6, 2000), http://www.nad.org/ciposition (“Many within the
medical profession continue to view deafness essentially as a disability and an abnormality
and believe that deaf and hard of hearing individuals need to be ‘fixed’ by cochlear
implants. This pathological view must be challenged and corrected by greater exposure to
and interaction with well-adjusted and successful deaf and hard of hearing individuals.”);
cf. HANS S. REINDERS, THE FUTURE OF THE DISABLED IN LIBERAL SOCIETY: AN ETHICAL
ANALYSIS 45–46 (2000) (“Preventing the birth of a disabled child because its life will be
devalued as abnormal is surely morally different from preventing the birth of a disabled
child that will suffer a serious illness. . . . Even if in both cases their lives may be burdened
by distress to similar degrees, their distress is very different in kind. . . . Given the fact that
illness is necessarily a pathology, the appropriate response is medical care. But in cases of
limited capabilities, the problem resulting need not be stated in medical terms at all.
Limited capabilities are a source of human suffering depending on the social and cultural
environment. In these cases, of which fragile X syndrome is an example, people suffer
from a disabling condition, not because of illness but because of how this condition is
socially evaluated. . . . If the cause of the suffering is society rather than nature, the more
appropriate response would be political rather than medical.”).
33
Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, 23 J. OF SOC. PHIL. 105,
106 (1992); see also id. (describing disability as “a very different category from illness”);
see also, e.g., Andrew Solomon, The Autism Rights Movement, N.Y. MAG., June 2, 2008, at
32 (discussing the views of activists who “argue that autism is not an illness but an
alternative way of being”).
32

nineteenth centuries.34
This point is most clear in situations where surgery would have
absolutely no impact on the person’s functioning independent of alleviating
negative social responses from others. For example, disability activists
have widely criticized parents of children with Down syndrome who have
hired plastic surgeons to reshape their children’s facial features. Such
surgery, of course, has no effect on the child’s mental or physical
capabilities.35 The sole justification for the surgery is to ameliorate the
social stigma and isolation the child may experience due to other persons’
reactions to his appearance.36 The perceived need for such surgery derives
34

The widespread tendency to conflate illness and disability is understandable in light of
the historical reality that the medical profession has had predominant responsibility for
defining and describing disability. In order to receive disability compensation, such as
Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, an individual must have documentation from
a physician. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Comparative Disability Employment Law From an
American Perspective, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 649, 657 (2003) (explaining that
SSDI/SSI claimants “must adduce the testimony of medical professionals in support of
their claims of disability”). Similarly, many courts interpret the ADA to require plaintiffs
to procure medical opinions regarding their disability even when their disability, such as
mental retardation, does not require—or respond to—medical treatment. See Deirdre M.
Smith, Who Says You’re Disabled? The Role of Medical Evidence in the ADA Definition of
Disability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1, 20 (“[T]he dominant trend in the decisions is to assign a
central and indispensable role to medical professionals in establishing disability for
purposes of the ADA.”). As humanities scholarship aptly demonstrates, this tendency to
conflate disability with disease is not limited to law but in fact permeates most, if not all,
discussions of disability. See, e.g., Bernhard Helander, Disability as Incurable Illness:
Health, Process, and Personhood in Southern Somalia, in DISABILITY AND CULTURE 73,
73 (Benedicte Ingstad & Susan Reynolds Whyte eds., 1995) (“In much of contemporary
anthropological work on the disabled there is a difficulty in defining and separating
disability from disease.”); Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and
Social Prejudice, 3 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 141, 152 (1987) (“In the comedy classic ‘Annie
Hall,’ Woody Allen has his principal male character say: ‘I feel that life is divided up into
the horrible and the miserable. Those are the two categories. . . . The horrible would be
like, I don’t know, terminal cases, you know, and blind people, cripples. I don’t know how
they get through life. It’s amazing to me. You know. The miserable is everyone else. So
when you go through life, you should be thankful that you’re miserable. . . .’ Allen’s
character expresses two common prejudices: he lumps disabled people with those who are
terminally ill, and he sees an enormous gulf separating them from ‘everyone else,’ much
like the chasm between ‘the great neuropathic family’ and the rest of humanity.”).
35
Crossley, supra note 24, at 663 (noting that “some plastic surgeons justify performing
radical facial surgery on children with Down’s syndrome to correct facial anomalies—even
though such surgery has no effect on mental functions—simply on the grounds that
emotional and behavioral responses to the children will improve following the surgery”
(citing Jonathan Sinclair Carey, The Quasimodo Complex: Deformity Reconsidered, in THE
TYRANNY OF THE NORMAL: AN ANTHOLOGY 27, 45 (Carol Donley & Sheryl Buckley eds.,
1996))).
36
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solely from negative cultural responses, a problem external to the child. In
this manner, such surgeries arguably parallel attempts to lighten the skin
pigmentation of children born into cultures that stigmatize persons with
dark skin.
While medical responses to other disabilities—such as cochlear
implant surgery to address deafness—can actually change a person’s
physical capabilities, the availability of such medical procedures may also
serve to downplay the possibility of changing the cultural factors that
contribute to the disadvantages the individual may experience. Operating
from this perspective, Robert Carver has compared efforts to shape his deaf
daughter into the mold of a hearing person to the ancient Chinese practice
of binding young girls’ feet.37 Suggesting that medical efforts to reduce
disability forcibly twist a person’s natural state for the purpose of
conforming them to cultural norms imposed by a dominant group, he
explains that:
At the speech and hearing clinic, I was trained to bind the
mind of my daughter. Like the twisting of feet into lotus
hooks, I was encouraged to force her deaf mind into a
hearing shape. I must withhold recognition of her most
eloquent gestures until she makes a sound, any sound. I
must force her to wear hearing aids no matter how she
struggles against them. The shape of a hearing mind is so
much more attractive.38
As this perspective suggests, technological adjustments to an individual that
will enable her body to better fit within existing able-bodied culture often
serve to validate the assumption that the “problem” of disability lies solely
within the individual. Medical procedures to “correct” disability mask the
reality that much of the disadvantage associated with disability is
attributable to a socially-constructed environment that unnecessarily
disadvantages physically-variant individuals.
In sum, the ADA’s core objective of reforming the social forces that
constrict the opportunities available to persons with disabilities suggests
that corrective surgery should not be a precondition to membership in the
ADA’s protected class. The ADA’s premise that the disadvantages persons
with disabilities experience are largely cultural—and thus culturally
contingent—counters the assumption that the ADA prevents persons with
disabilities from rejecting medical efforts to “normalize” their physiology.
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Fiona Kumari Campbell, Legislating Disability: Negative Ontologies and the
Government of Legal Identities, in FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY 108,
119 (Shelley Tremain ed., 2005) (quoting Robert Carver).
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II. “CORRECTIVE” SURGERY AND CURRENT CASELAW
A. The ADA’s General Coverage Provisions
Reading the ADA to permit persons to argue that their physical
difference should be accepted rather than erased not only fits with the
ADA’s grounding in a social model of disability, it also fits with the ADA’s
text, which appears to include persons who decline corrective surgery. The
following discussion of the ADA focuses on the ADA’s original text.
Where relevant, the text and footnotes note changes to the ADA’s text made
by the ADA Amendments Act, which goes into effect in January 2009.
Current doctrine on the question of whether persons who decline
“corrective” surgery may access the ADA focuses on the interpretation of
the ADA’s coverage provisions.39 The ADA’s coverage provisions indicate
that in order to obtain relief under the ADA, a plaintiff must first
demonstrate that she is a “qualified individual with a disability.”40 The
ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the
individual”41 “such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”42 The
“substantially limit[ed]” standard requires a plaintiff to show that she is
“[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which [she] can perform a particular major life activity as compared [to] . . .
the average person in the general population.”43
39

Unlike Title VII, under which the protected classes—race, sex, color, religion, and
national origin—encompass everyone, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000), the ADA
has a limited protected class that includes only a segment of the U.S. population. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
40
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
41
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). Title I also provides alternate definitions of disability that
are beyond the scope of this article. An individual may meet these alternate definitions if
she has “a record of such an impairment” that substantially limits one or more of her major
life activities or is “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(B)&(C) (2000).
42
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008) (“Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working.”).
43
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2008); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
184, 197 (2002). The ADA Amendments Act expressly rejects the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of “substantially limits” in Toyota. It provides that “the standard created by
the Supreme Court in the case of Toyota for ‘substantially limits,’ and applied by lower
courts in numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately high level of limitation
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA.” ADA Amendments Act § (2)(b)(5).

Based on this statutory definition, many persons who decline
corrective surgery would appear to fall within the class of persons entitled
to the ADA’s protection. For example, Sarah appears to be an individual
with a disability within the meaning of the statute. Compared to the
average member of the general population, Sarah is significantly restricted
as to the condition and manner under which she can hear, an activity which
the Supreme Court has acknowledged as a major life activity within the
meaning of the statute.44 Accordingly, if Sarah is qualified for the job she
desires, she appears to fall within the ADA’s protected class.
The conclusion some courts have espoused that a plaintiff’s “refusal
to seek the recommended and available treatment precludes [her] from
being a ‘qualified individual with a disability’”45 disregards the ADA’s
definition of the term “qualified.” The ADA does not define “qualified” in
terms of the individual’s use of available medical technology. Instead, it
defines “qualified” to mean that the individual “can perform the essential
functions of the employment position” she holds or desires.46 Regulations
promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission further
provide that the term “qualified” means that the individual satisfies the
requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of
the employment position.47 In our hypothetical, Sarah has chosen a job that
she can perform without disability-related accommodations so she is
“qualified” within the meaning of the ADA. The fact that Sarah might have
different capabilities if she undergoes cochlear implant surgery appears
irrelevant to her status as a member of the ADA’s protected class.
B. Unsettling the Sutton v. United Air Lines Framework
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Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197 (acknowledging that the category of “major life
activities” within the ADA includes hearing). The ADA Amendments Act, which adds an
express list of sample “major life activities to the ADA’s text, lists hearing as a major life
activity. ADA Amendments Act § 3(3).
45
Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Va., 937 F. Supp. 541, 548 (E.D. Va. 1996) (emphasis
added); see also Hewitt v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y.
2001) (“A plaintiff who does not avail himself of corrective medication is not a qualified
individual under the ADA.”); Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596
(D. Md. 2000) (“A plaintiff who does not avail herself of proper treatment is not a
‘qualified individual’ under the ADA.”); cf. Pangalos v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 960167, 1996 WL 612469, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1996) (suggesting that a person would not
receive the ADA’s protection if “the disabling condition he allege[d] could readily be
remedied surgically”).
46
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
47
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2008).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. United Air
Lines currently underpins many judicial conclusions that the ADA’s
protected class excludes persons like Sarah who have declined to undergo
available “corrective” surgery.49 In Sutton, the Supreme Court addressed a
different, related question: the effect of an individual’s voluntary use of
mitigating measures on her right to access the ADA. The Sutton Court
concluded that when an individual employs mitigating measures, such as
hearing aids, to bring an otherwise “substantially limiti[ng]” physical or
mental impairment below the statutory “substantially limit[ing]” level, the
individual falls outside the ADA’s protected class.50 Accordingly, the
Sutton court held that the ADA excludes persons who reduce the effects of
their disability with medical technology such as hearing aids or epilepsy
medication.51
The Sutton Court rested its holding on the rationale that “[b]ecause
the phrase ‘substantially limits’ appears in the Act in the present indicative
verb form, . . . the language is properly read as requiring that a person be
presently—not potentially or hypothetically—substantially limited” in order
to fall within the ADA’s protected class.52 The Court reasoned that
speculation “based on general information about how an uncorrected
impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual’s actual
condition,” would “run[] directly counter to the individualized inquiry
mandated by the ADA.”53
48
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Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
See infra notes 55–57
50
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481–82.
51
See, e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 350 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
person with epilepsy did not fall within the ADA’s protected class because her medication
reduced her symptoms below the substantially limiting level); Chenoweth v. Hillsborough
County, 250 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding the same); see also Bradley A.
Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of
Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 219 (2008) (“The scope of Sutton
cannot be ignored. Its ruling excludes a vast number of potential plaintiffs from coverage
under the ADA.”).
52
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
53
Id. at 483. The Court further noted the ADA preamble’s estimate that “43 million”
Americans have conditions the ADA recognizes as disabilities came from a census that,
based on a functional approach to disability, excluded persons who had effectively
ameliorated their condition with medical technology. Id. at 485–86. See also 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(1) (2000) (“[S]ome 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities . . . .”); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 486–87 (reasoning that the “43 million figure
reflects [Congressional] understanding that those whose impairments are largely corrected
by medication or other devices are not ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the ADA. . . . Had
Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those
covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled
persons in the findings”); id. at 485–86 (noting that the report that generated the 43 million
49

The Sutton court’s conclusion that an individual’s decision to use
mitigating measures could preclude an individual’s membership in the
ADA’s protected class encouraged many courts to conclude that an
individual’s decision to decline corrective surgery also precludes her
membership in the ADA’s protected class.54 Courts used Sutton to reason
that the ADA’s protected class excludes not only persons who use
mitigating measures to bring themselves below the statutory “substantially
limit[ed]” level but also persons who could use such measures.55 In other
words, they determined, based on Sutton, that the availability of medical
technology determines the scope of the ADA’s protected class. For
example, the District Court of the Southern District of New York reasoned,
in light of Sutton, that a plaintiff “cannot be said to [be] substantially
impaired if she neglect[s] to avail herself of . . . corrective measures.”56
Similarly, the District Court of the Southern District of Florida concluded
that when a plaintiff’s “condition is treatable and can be corrected . . . [the
p]laintiff cannot demonstrate that he is ‘substantially limited in a major life
activity.’”57 In effect, these courts concluded that when medical technology
could remove a person’s currently experienced substantial limitation, Sutton
excludes the person from the ADA’s protected class, regardless of whether
the person has actually adopted the medical technology.
The ADA Amendments Act undermines this rationale for excluding
the ADA’s protections to persons who decline mitigating measures for their
disabilities from the ADA’s protected class. Expressly rejecting the Sutton
Court’s holding, the amendments bring most persons who have effectively
mitigated their disability—such as persons who use hearing aids or epilepsy
figure “took an explicitly functional approach to evaluating disabilities. . . . It measured . . .
persons with a ‘functional limitation’ on performing certain basic activities when using, as
the questionnaire put it, ‘special aids’”).
54
A few courts had reached this conclusion prior to the Sutton decision. See, e.g., Bowers
v. Multimedia Cablevision, Inc., No. CIV.A. 96-1298-JTM, 1998 WL 856074, at *4 (D.
Kan. Nov. 3, 1998); Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Va., 937 F. Supp. 541, 548 (E.D. Va.
1996); Pangalos v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 96-0167, 1996 WL 612469, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 15, 1996); Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F.Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio
1988).
55
See, e.g., Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(“Where a person’s impairment can be treated and symptoms alleviated by mitigating
factors such as medication or treatments, such medications or treatments must be taken into
account in determining disability.” (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482–83)); Spradley v.
Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232–33 (D. Kan. 1999) (expanding the
Sutton opinion’s actual holding to assert that “[t]he Supreme Court has recently held that if
a disorder can be controlled by medication or other corrective measures, it does not
substantially limit a major life activity”).
56
Johnson v. Maynard, No. 01 Civ. 7393(AKH), 2003 WL 548754, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
25, 2003).
57
Mont-Ros v. City of W. Miami, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1356–57 (S.D. Fla. 2000).

medication—into the ADA’s protected class.58 Although the amendments
do not appear to contemplate whether persons who decline mitigating
measures fall within the ADA’s protected class, the amendments’ express
rejection of Sutton significantly unsettles the Sutton-based rationale for
excluding nonmitigators. By making used medical technology that removes
an individual’s substantial limitation no longer relevant to her membership
in the ADA’s protected class, the amendments appear to make the
availability of unused medical technology irrelevant as well.
Furthermore, even if courts are unwilling to read the ADA
Amendments Act to expressly bring nonmitigators like Sarah into the
ADA’s protected class, courts need not necessarily read Sutton itself to take
them outside the class. Unlike Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in
Sutton which occasionally used the term “correctable disabilities” to
describe the category of conditions that the Sutton Court deemed to fall
outside of the ADA’s scope,59 the Sutton majority opinion eschewed a
dichotomy between “correctable” and “uncorrectable” conditions.60 The
58

In their current form, the amendments provide that “[t]he determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures . . . .” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, H.R.
3195, 110th Cong. § 3(5)(D)(i) (2008); see also id. § 2(b)(2) (noting that the Act “reject[s]
the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton . . . that whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures”). The amendments would also undermine
Sutton by permitting persons not seeking a reasonable accommodation to establish
membership in the ADA’s protected class without demonstrating a substantial limitation of
a major life activity. See id. § 3(4)(A).
59
See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I agree that 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A) does not reach the legions of people with correctable disabilities.”); see also
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 502–03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that “[t]he Act generally
protects individuals who have ‘correctable’ substantially limiting impairments from
unjustified employment discrimination on the basis of those impairments”).
60
The Court uses the language “could correct” only once—in its recitation of the district
court’s opinion. See id. at 471 (“The [district] court held that petitioners were not actually
disabled under subsection (A) of the disability definition because they could fully correct
their visual impairments.”). In the rest of the opinion, the majority’s language indicates
that its framework for determining membership in the protected class focuses on the
person’s actual state rather than on the availability of mitigating measures. See, e.g., id. at
482 (“[I]f a person is taking [not “could take”] measures to correct for, or mitigate, a
physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures—both positive and negative—
must be taken into account when judging whether that person is ‘substantially limited’ in a
major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under the Act.”) (emphasis added); id. at 482 (“A
‘disability’ exists only where an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, not
where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were
not taken [not “were not available”].”); id. at 486 (“[T]hose whose impairments are largely
corrected by medication or other devices [not “correctable”] are not ‘disabled’ within the
meaning of the ADA.”) (emphasis added); id. at 487 (“Had Congress intended to include

Sutton majority emphasized that both “[t]he use or nonuse of a corrective
device does not determine whether an individual” falls within the ADA’s
protected class; instead, that determination hinges on “whether the
limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact
substantially limiting.”61
all persons with corrected [not “correctable”] physical limitations among those covered by
the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the
findings. That it did not is evidence that the ADA’s coverage is restricted to only those
whose impairments are not mitigated [not “able to be mitigated”] by corrective measures.”)
(emphasis added); id. at 488 (“[O]ne has a disability under subsection (A) if,
notwithstanding the use of a corrective device [not “the availability of a corrective
device”], that individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.”) (emphasis added);
id. at 486 (“[T]he 43 million figure reflects an understanding that those whose impairments
are largely corrected by medication or other devices [not “correctable”] are not ‘disabled’
within the meaning of the ADA.”) (emphasis added).
61
Id. at 488 (first emphasis added). Even Justice Stevens, who used the term “correctable
disabilities,” acknowledged that the majority’s framework hinged on the use of mitigating
measures. See id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the Court as reaching the
“counterintuitive conclusion that the ADA’s safeguards vanish when individuals make
themselves more employable by ascertaining ways to overcome their physical or mental
limitations”). Additionally, the Court’s heavy emphasis on the statutory estimate that 43
million Americans fall within the ADA’s protected class suggests that the ADA covers
persons who decline mitigating measures. In its discussion of the reports that gave rise to
the statutory estimate of 43 million, the Court indicates that the report excluded not all
persons who could use medical technology to ameliorate their disability, but only persons
who actually used such technology. See id. at 485–86 (noting that the report that generated
the 43 million figure “measured . . . persons with a ‘functional limitation’ on performing
certain basic activities when using, as the questionnaire put it, ‘special aids’ such as glasses
or hearing aids, if the person usually used such aids”) (emphasis added); see also Capizzi
v. County of Placer, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“The conclusion that a
failure to mitigate does not defeat the cause of action is supported by Sutton. There the
Court observed that in the ADA ‘the phrase “substantially limits” appears . . . in the present
indicative verb form, . . . [indicating that] the language is properly read as requiring that a
person be presently—not potentially or hypothetically—substantially limited in order to
demonstrate a disability.’ It should follow from the fact that the question of disability
addresses plaintiff’s current condition, that the fact that a particular procedure would
mitigate the condition cannot prevent a finding that the plaintiff is presently disabled.”)
(citation omitted); Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1038 (D.
Ariz. 1999) (reasoning, based on Sutton, that courts should assess the “limitations an
individual presently faces”); see also Instructions for Field Offices: Analyzing ADA
Charges After Supreme Court Decisions Addressing “Disability” and “Qualified,” EEOC,
July 22, 1999, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/field-ada.html (reprinted in Agency
Guidance in Binder 2A) (“The [Sutton] Court also emphasized that the disability
determination must be based on a person’s actual condition at the time of the alleged
discrimination. Therefore, if a [plaintiff] did not use a mitigating measure at that time, an
Investigator must determine whether s/he was substantially limited in a major life activity
based solely on his/her actual condition. For the purpose of determining whether a
[plaintiff] meets the definition of ‘disability,’ speculation regarding whether the person
would have been substantially limited if s/he used a mitigating measure is irrelevant.”).

Furthermore, the Sutton Court’s warning that it would violate “both
the letter and the spirit of the ADA” to judge membership in the protected
class based on an individual’s hypothetical state62 would seem to doubly
apply to speculation about the effect an unadopted medical procedure might
have on an individual. While estimating the difficulties a person who
currently employs medical technology would experience without that
technology would often be aided by records of the individual’s prior
condition, predicting the effect of unadopted technology on an individual
will nearly always require reliance on generalizations and statistical data,
precisely the type of analysis that Sutton forbids.63 Accordingly, while the
Sutton decision has led many courts to read the ADA to exclude persons
who decline medical technology that might remove the substantial
limitation they currently experience, Sutton’s reasoning suggests the
opposite conclusion. It suggests than an individual currently experiencing a
substantial limitation of a major life activity should fall within the ADA’s
protected class even if an unused medical procedure might remove that
substantial limitation.64
C. Beyond the General Coverage Provisions
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Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483, 484; see also id. at 482 (“A ‘disability’ exists only where an
impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, not where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or
‘would’ be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.”).
63
The effectiveness of cochlear implant surgery, for example, varies widely from
individual to individual and is difficult to precisely predict. David B. Pisoni, Individual
Differences in Effectiveness of Cochlear Implants, 106 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC’Y OF AM. 2212
(1999) (explaining research demonstrating that “the effectiveness of cochlear implants
varies widely” and that it is difficult to predict, in advance, the degree to which an implant
will enable an individual to perceive speech).
64
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). See Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 277 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir.
2002) (“[Sutton] is not . . . license for courts to meander in ‘would, could, or should-have’
land. We consider only the measures actually taken and consequences that actually follow.
. . . Those who discriminate take their victims as they find them.”); Jamison v. Dow
Chemical Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d 715, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (“The use or nonuse of a
corrective device does not determine whether an individual is disabled; that determination
depends on whether the limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in
fact substantial limiting.” (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488)); Williams v. Thresholds, Inc.,
No. 02 C 9101, 2003 WL 22232835, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2003) (“The Sutton court
explicitly stated that courts should not engage in counter-factual hypothesizing, guessing
whether a course of treatment would have alleviated a plaintiff’s disability.”); Bertinetti v.
Joy Mining Machinery, 231 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833–34 (S.D. Ill. 2002) (“Sutton . . . does not
give courts a license to ‘meander in “would, could, or should-have” land.’ Courts should
only consider mitigating steps actually taken and the consequences that actually followed.
Accordingly, this court will not speculate about what Bertinetti’s condition would be if he
had taken additional steps to improve his condition.” (citation omitted)).

Other provisions in the ADA’s text support this reading of the
ADA’s general coverage provisions. For example, the ADA’s express
exclusion of nonmitigators with a particular type of disability from its
protected class discredits the inference that the ADA generally excludes
persons who decline conventional treatment for their disability. Section
12114 provides that drug addiction may qualify an individual for disability
discrimination protection only when the individual is engaged in
conventional efforts to eliminate the disability.65 Congress added this
provision to the Act after receiving advice from the Attorney General that
the Act would otherwise prohibit employers from taking adverse
employment actions on the basis of current illegal drug use against persons
whose addiction substantially limited one or more of their major life
activities.66 The fact that the Attorney General and Congress believed that
the ADA needed an amendment explicitly requiring persons addicted to
illegal drugs to mitigate their disability suggests that they believed the
ADA’s protected class generally included persons who decline conventional
treatment. The few members of Congress who characterized the “drug
addiction” amendment as unnecessary based this characterization on the
belief that courts would read the recently-enacted Drug Free Workplace Act
to trump the ADA, not because they believed the ADA already excluded
nonmitigators from its protected class.67
Furthermore, another frequently-overlooked provision of the ADA
provides support for the view that individuals with disabilities may reject
unwanted medical procedures without forgoing the ADA’s protection from
65

42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(2) (2000) (providing that addiction to illegal drugs may qualify a
person for membership in the ADA’s protected class only if the person is“participating in a
supervised rehabilitation program and . . . no longer engaging [in illegal drug] use”).
Members of Congress regarded drug addiction as inherently negative and deserving of
protection only if the person is taking all reasonable means to eliminate it. See The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2273, Before the
Subcomm. on Select Education and Employment Opportunities of the H. Comm. on
Education and Labor, 101st Cong. 40 (1989) (“[D]rug and alcohol addicts should not be
placed into the same categories as those with physical and mental impairments . . . .”)
(statement of Rep. Steve Bartlett, Member, H. Subcomm. on Select Education of the
Comm. on Education and Labor); cf. Tim Edwards, Constitutional Limits on an Employer’s
Right to Dictate the Terms of an Addict’s Recovery Under the ADA: Some Sobering
Concerns, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1679, 1700 (1999) (reading this provision as “evinc[ing] a
political commitment to conventional treatment as a condition to coverage, and
employment, under the ADA” of persons addicted to illegal drugs).
66
Staff of H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., Legislative History of Public
Law 101-336 (Comm. Print. 1990) (describing the Attorney General’s opinion that, without
an amendment to exclude current illegal drug users from the statute’s scope, the statute’s
disability definition would include persons substantially limited by addiction to illegal
drugs).
67
See 135 CONG. REC. S10777 (1989).

disability discrimination. Section 12201(d), which Congress added by
amendment prior to the ADA’s initial passage, provides that “[n]othing in
this [Act] shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to
accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit which such
individual chooses not to accept.”68 Although the legislative history of this
provision suggests that the sponsors of the amendment likely envisioned it
as predominantly addressing unnecessary employer- (or public entity-)
provided accommodations,69 the inclusion of this provision lends support to
the view that when an individual is able to perform a job without disabilityrelated accommodations, the ADA permits her to reject aids she does not
need, including medical technology such as cochlear implants.
In sum, the ADA’s text appears to permit individuals who decline
“corrective” surgery to challenge disability discrimination. Its coverage
provisions textually include persons who decline “corrective” surgery. The
Supreme Court’s Sutton v. United Air Lines decision, which contributed to
many courts’ conclusions that the ADA requires individuals to undergo
corrective surgery, in fact prevents courts from excluding persons from the
ADA’s protected class based on the hypothetical benefits of unadopted
medical technology. Accordingly, courts should hold that the ADA’s
protected class includes persons, like Sarah, who decline corrective surgery.
CONCLUSION
In keeping with the ADA’s focus on changing social responses to
disability, courts should read the ADA to prioritize the modification of
culturally contingent social and environmental barriers over the masking or
eradication of disability. Courts should not regard the mere possibility that
medical technology could reduce or mask an individual’s physical
difference as obliging her to employ such technology. Instead, they should
read the ADA require employers to reshape the workplace to remove
unnecessary barriers rather than to require persons with disabilities to
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reshape themselves to fit existing norms. In this manner, the ADA will
better fit with the goals of the disability rights movement, which in the
tradition of many other groups previously excluded from public life,
proudly insists that “[w]e will not change to fit the mold. . . . Instead, we
will destroy the mold and change the world to make sure there is room for
everyone.”70
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